The strategy of manipulating joint decision-making

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the better outside option is critical in determining whether communication is truthful, overselling, or ineffective.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Kim, Jin Yeub ; Kwon, Heung Jin
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 123.2014, 2, p. 127-130
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Collective decision-making \| Communication \| Information

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906368