Third Party Assessments in Trust Problems with Conflict of Interest: An Experiment on the Effects of Promises

Is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor with conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as incentivized assessment (i.e. when assessor gain higher payoff if assessment is correct).

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Year of publication:	2012-12-12
Authors:	Kataria, Mitesh ; Winter, Fabian
Institutions:	Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Subject:	trust game \| communication \| cheap-talk \| promises \| oath

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Jena Economic Research Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2012-067
Classification:	A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616572