Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promises

Is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor having a conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as an incentivized assessment (i.e. when the assessor gains higher payoff if the assessment is correct).

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Kataria, Mitesh ; Winter, Fabian
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 120.2013, 1, p. 53-56
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Trust game \| Communication \| Cheap-talk \| Promises \| Oath

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665695