Transparency in relational contracts
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Fahn, Matthias ; Zanarone, Giorgio |
Published in: |
Strategic management journal. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 1097-0266, ZDB-ID 1478912-7. - Vol. 43.2022, 5, p. 1046-1071
|
Subject: | accountability | incentives | relational contracts | social comparisons | transparency | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Transparenz | Transparency | Vertrag | Contract |
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