Two-valued strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions

We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

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Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	De Simone, Anna ; Bhaskara Rao, K. P. S.
Published in:	Games. - ISSN 2073-4336. - Vol. 15.2024, 6, p. 1-9
Publisher:	Basel : MDPI
Subject:	social choice functions \| weak preferences \| weak manipulability \| veto rule \| serial dictator

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g15060044 [DOI] 1918700060 [GVK] hdl:10419/330113 [Handle]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015471719