Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ewerhart, Christian
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 125.2014, 1, p. 115-118
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Rent-seeking \| Private information \| Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium \| Existence \| Uniqueness

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939496