When Managers Cannot Commit : Capital Structure Under Inalienable Managerial Entrenchment

When partially inalienable managerial entrenchment is introduced to Zwiebel's 1996 model of dynamic capital structure, anticipated debt renegotiation between a higher-type manager and the creditor reduces expected firm value. Only lower-type managers can issue debt to avoid shareholder takeover

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Thomas, Catherine
Other Persons:	Wang, Yongxiang (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Kapitalstruktur \| Capital structure \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance

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