A rule for 3-way division of profits based on peer evaluation reports is impartial if the calculation of each partner's share ignores her report, exact if it never allocates more or less than the profit to be shared, and consensual if it respects evaluations when the partners' reports are in...

In two-sided matching markets, stability can be costly. We define social welfare functions for matching markets and use them to formulate a definition of the price of stability. We then show that it is common to find a price tag attached to stability, and that the price of stability can be...

This paper studies welfare tradeoffs in two-sided, one-to-one matching markets. We begin by providing theoretical upper bounds on a utilitarian price of stability, and show that these bounds vary with the composition of participants’ ordinal preference lists. We then turn to simulation...

A simple head-to-head voting scheme in which voters hold complete and transitive preferences over alternatives generates all binary relations on finite sets. The minimal number of voters required to generate a binary relation provides a measure of complexity for binary relations. Complexity so...

A symmetric difference metric topology on the collection of binary relations on a countably infinite set provides a new setting for the study of properties of preferences and, as an illustration, is used to lend credence and meaning to some simple intuitions about properties of binary relations....

We assign a probabilistic evaluation to a firm as a measure, in the form of a probability distribution over [0,1], of the quality of the firm’s products. When two firms compete to develop a new product, a prospective investor can use the two evaluations to determine which firm is likely to...

We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses...

A preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation if it can be derived from an arrangement of individuals and alternatives on a line, with each individual preferring the nearer of each pair of alternatives. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether a given...