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(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static andDynamic Bargaining Experiments

Fischer, Sven; González Morales, Luis G.; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602

Measuring the Degree of Ambiguity about Probability: Experimental Evidence

Morone, Andrea; Özdemir, Özlem - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

This paper aims to experimentally investigate how individual willingness to pay for a lottery is affected by using a new way of representing of probabilistic ambiguity. Thus we can see how individual valuation reacts to different degrees of ambiguity probability information provided to subjects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866670

Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies

Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

. We report the results of a series ofexperiments. The first experiment is designed as a straightforward theory … symmetric networks. Collusion cannot account for the observed behavior. In our second experiment we reject the conjecture that … two-stage game. Finally, in our third experiment we reduce the complexity of the setting by transforming the original two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866674

The Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions in the Laboratory:A Stress Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism

Boun My, Kene; Cochard, François; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

We investigate the ability of the damage based tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a controlled laboratory environment which incorporates important aspects of nonpoint pollution problems. Our experimental setting combines a strictly convex damage function with uncertainty in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866677

Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Gameswith Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs

Fischer, Sven - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680

Strategic Delay and Rational Imitation in the Laboratory

Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Boun My, Kene; VERGNAUD, JEAN; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866694

Laboratory Bilateral Gift Exchange:The Impact of Loss Aversion

Dittrich, Dennis; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

The employment relationship is characterized by incomplete contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage without explicit performance incentives meaning that workers have a large degree of discretion over effort levels. As a consequence, an employee’s general jobattitude...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866697

Cooperative Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

suf-¯cient to induce cooperative outcomes. In the second experiment we introduce the pairwisecommitment mechanism and we … observe aggregate cooperation rates beyond those observedin the ¯rst experiment whatever the monitoring cost but also beyond …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866705

“One Man, One Dollar”?Examining the equalization argument in support ofcampaign contribution limits

Vanberg, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limitsimposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Suchcontribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption,the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866710

Bribery and Public Procurement–An Experimental Study–

Büchner, Susanne; Freytag, Andreas; González Morales, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2006

provider.The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private costassumption. In the experiment, bribes are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866715