We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the...

This paper models the data generating process of common value auctions in a parameter-estimation way, known as the classical approach in statistical inference. Viewing the true value of the object as a parameter that nobody ever knows, we let our value function be the average of the individual...

We show that every strategy-proof random social choice function is a convex combination of strategy-proof deterministic social choice functions in a two-alternative voting model. This completely characterizes all strategy-proof random social choice functions in this setting.

I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller’s discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.

If a positive proportion of traders are naive (i.e., honestly reveal their types and bid/ask truthfully), then efficiency increases in a double auction with preplay communication. Presence of naive traders induces strategic traders to decrease the misrepresentation of their private information.

We analyze a simultaneous screening problem in competition among top schools. The model predicts that when the second best school has similar prestige to the best one it could attract better students by choosing the same entrance examination date.

In a bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed, inequity-averse parties, a fully efficient mechanism (i.e., the double auction) exists if and only if compassion is strong. Less compassionate parties do not trade in the double auction in the limit of strong envy.

The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

The restart effect occurs in linear voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) experiments when there is an upward pulse in contributions to the group account following a stoppage and then restarting of the VCM experiment. Although the restart effect is a well-known empirical regularity little...