Showing 1 - 10 of 158
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407530
In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous— time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062331
We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550865
A large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the possibility of one or more players being other than fully rational can have significant effects on equilibrium behavior. This literature leaves unexplained the presence of behavioral players in the first place,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550888
Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541
We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062361
The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407617
This paper studies models where the correspondences (or functions) under consideration are never increasing (or weakly decreasing) in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games of strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407559
This paper aims at analysing the effects of learning on the individual behaviour in an experiment that requires cooperation and coordination within teams. Using artificial agents, different social contests are created, as training environments. The results confirm previous findings (on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407620
(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407571