We consider the framework of repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. We compare the equilibrium payoffs of the informed player in two cases: where he is facing either a) a single long-lived uninformed player, or b) a sequence of short-lived uninformed players. We...

We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent...

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

In the framework of dynamic programming we provide two results: (1) An example where uniform convergence of the "T"-stage value does not imply equality of the limit and the lower infinite value. (2) Generalized Tauberian theorems, that relate uniform convergence of the "T"-stage value to uniform...

Given an information structure a function that measures how the inferences made by the agents spread among the states is defined; it specifies for each event its impact at each state, for each agent. Several properties are established.