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In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702952
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269805
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557231
Milton Friedman has famously claimed that the responsibility of a manager who is not the owner of a firm is "to conduct the business in accordance with their [the shareholders'] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible." In this paper we argue that when contracts are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011931754
Milton Friedman has famously claimed that the responsibility of a manager who is not the owner of a firm is "to conduct the business in accordance with their [the shareholders'] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible." In this paper we argue that when contracts are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011906086
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in … distribution ; motivation ; experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981608
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141429
We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström?s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents? unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261580
experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261601
We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmstroem's career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents' unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075397