We study network formation where nodes are born sequentially and form links with previously born nodes. Connections are formed through a combination of random meetings and through search, as in Jackson and Rogers (2007). A newborn's random meetings of existing nodes are type-dependent and the...

Whether an idea, information, or infection, diffuses throughout a society depends not only on the structure of the network of interactions, but also on the timing of those interactions. People are not always available to interact with others, and people differ in the timing of when they are...

We examine different populations' play in coordination games in online experiments with over a thousand subjects. Subjects played a two-player coordination game that had multiple equilibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a...

I provide a (very) brief introduction to game theory. I have developed these notes to provide quick access to some of the basics of game theory; mainly as an aid for students in courses in which I assumed familiarity with game theory but did not require it as a prerequisite

Negotiation involves determining not only an agreement's price, but also its content, which typically has many aspects. We model such negotiations and provide conditions under which negotiation leads to efficient outcomes, even in the face of substantial asymmetric information regarding the...

We survey the literature on the economic consequences of the structure of social networks. We develop a taxonomy of 'macro' and 'micro' characteristics of social interaction networks and discuss both the theoretical and empirical findings concerning the role of those characteristics in...

We develop a theory of negotiation in which deals have multiple dimensions that can be bundled together. We use theory and experiments to show that in such settings efficient trade is possible even with substantial asymmetric information. The benefits of identifying areas of mutual gain guide...

We discuss social network analysis from the perspective of economics. We organize the presentation around the theme of externalities: the effects that one's behavior has on others' welfare. Externalities underlie the interdependencies that make networks interesting to social scientists. We...

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...