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A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261264
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325487
-pay auctions and rankorder tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010311082
Splitting leagues or tournaments seems to be puzzling when agents are homogeneous and splitting leads to a negative … tournaments (i.e., tournaments that are intertemporally linked), which also enhances incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263059
This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal / agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of e ort depends both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299113
Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the empirical importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major South...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369211
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422168
A theoretical model is adopted in order to explain incentives and actual safety behaviour for drivers, pedestrians and other road users which do not utilise motorised vehicles. A road user's outcome is supposed to be dependent on her individual actions and cares decided upon by other individuals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290672
Public reputation mechanisms are an effective means to limit opportunistic behavior in markets suffering from moral hazard problems. While previous research was mostly concerned with the influence of exogenous feedback mechanisms, this study considers the endogenous emergence of reputation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014503988
This paper extends the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard to allow for agents having reference- dependent preferences according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The main finding is that loss aversion leads to fairly simple contracts. In particular, when shifting the focus from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264926