If negotiation over ownership of an asset is unsuccessful, agents go to court to determine possession. Experiments examine how the presence of a stochastic court decision affects pretrial bargaining behavior. Two players have private information over the value of an asset, owned by one player....

Illegal tying often occurs when a monopolist jointly sells a product with a complementary requirement, also sold competitively. Along with selling the complement at its competi tive price, this paper shows that profit can increase when a monopoli st lets consumers bundle any amount of the...

In many bargaining environments there are random delays in the transmission of proposals. Two computerized bargaining experiments are designed to study behavior with this condition. A clock starts counting down from three minutes when the first offer is sent. In one experiment the clock is not...

This paper reports the results of several experiments investigating dynamic consumer behavior. When consumers know their incomes and prices but are uncertain about their preferences, the authors find that they typically adopt a two-step approach to locating optimal consumption bundles....

This paper reports forty-five laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand...

The authors consider an imperfect test of product quality and ask how it interacts with adverse selection to affect market size. Although one might expect adverse selection to be mitigated, there are scenarios where it is exacerbated. Also, two counterintuitive comparative static results emerge....

The authors analyze a common property resource model with a single incumbent firm that faces future potential entry of a rival. The cost of harvest from the resource is a function of the stock size. By drawing down current stock sufficiently, which lowers future stock, the incumbent can make...