We analyze a monopolist’s incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time and...

This paper considers a trade situation where the production activities of potentially heterogeneous countries generate pollution which can cross borders and harm the well-being of all the countries involved. In each of those countries the policy market levies pollution taxes on the polluting...

In this paper, we are interested in how a pharmaceutical industry manages existing antibiotic drugs in the context of bacterial resistance. We consider a model based on an epidemiological framework where antibiotic recovery rates, and thus intrinsic qualities, may differ. Antibiotic efficacy is...

We characterize the equilibrium level of emissions, the equilibrium stock of global pollution and the discounted net social welfare for both the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria when the countries face the threat of a sudden irreversible jump in the global damages at an unknown date....

We examine how adaptation to climate change affects the incentives to ratify international environmental agreements (IEAs). In particular, we study the effects of two aspects on the incentives to join a coalition. First, we analyze cross-country differences in adaptation costs. Second, we...

This paper considers a trade situation where the production activities of potentially heterogeneous countries generate pollution which can cross borders and harm the well-being of all the countries involved. In each of those countries the policy maker levies pollution taxes on the polluting...

This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases with the first-period emissions, we examine the issue of coalition formation...

We analyze a monopolist's incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time- and...

This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and...

Animal welfare is a major concern for consumers. This concern has not gone unnoticed by sector stakeholders, especially egg producers. One of the fundamental changes likely to affect egg producers regards modes of production, specifically changes in housing systems, ranging from conventional...