This paper employs the theory of strategic market games (enhanced with a spatial dimension) in order to study the issue of market location in a perfectly competitive setup. In this framework, each player decides strategically where and what quantities she wishes to trade and, hence, the market...

We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this exercise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual...

This article characterizes the set of correlated equilibria that result from open negotiations, which players make prior to playing a strategic game. A negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium is defined as a correlated strategy in which the negotiation process among all of the players prevents...

We present the bargaining set of an economy, where trades among groups of individuals are conducted via the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. Then we prove that in atomless economies the allocations resulting from this equilibrium notion are competitive.

We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this excrcise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual...

In view of the well known core equivalence results in atomless economies, coincidence of market game equilibrium allocations with competitive allocations is tantamount to a three way equivalence between market game mechanisms, competitive equilibria and the core. Based on this idea we study...