Similar Search Results

The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 107 (2010) 1, pp. 58-62

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003970848

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? : an experimental test of adverse syelection theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.; Stahl, Konrad - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009767292

Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences : an experimental study

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: The review of economic studies 80 (2013) 4, pp. 1516-1544

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010202076

The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003856945

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? : an experimental test of adverse selection theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Games and economic behavior 89 (2015), pp. 17-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383729

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

Hoppe, Eva I. - 2009

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158937