This paper shows that if domestic firms do not have identical unit costs, then the interplay between the Herfindahl index of concentration and the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is of major importance in the determination of optimal trade policies. When the demand curve is concave,...

In this paper, the authors consider a European industry characterized by vertical product differentiation. Using a two-stages model with quality choice made before price competition takes place, the authors show that EU antidumping policy that takes the form of price-undertaking offers a...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna. We show that a foreign producer would choose a...

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman in the adress model of horizontal differenciation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competitio drastically.

In a world where firms are oligopolists, is it possible to create a customs union that raises the welfare of member countries without hurting non-members countries? We give sufficient conditions for an affirmative answer.

Although the world and its global economy become more and more integrated with each passing year, not all the correlated increase in trade could be unambiguously be called free trade. A significant share of world trade growth in the past generation has occured with state guided economies of...

We show that the Kemp-Wan proposition concerning the formation of customs union holds conditions of iperfect competition and increasing returns.

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate entrepreneurial time between lobbying and internal control (monitoring). We seek answers to the following questions: (i) if firms differ woth recpect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of time...

This paper studies the optimal production subsidies for domestic firms that compete in an export market against each other as well as against foreign rivals. Assuming that all firms do not have identical cost curves, it shows that the optimal policy for the home government is to give the more...

A model of location choice by Cournot oligopolists is presented, under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on the distance between firms. We show that a variety of patters emerge. Agglomeration is optimal under certain assumptions. Geographical dispersion in a two- dimensional plane is...