We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

Let µ be a rational distribution over a finite alphabet, and ( ) be a n-periodic sequences which first n elements are drawn i.i.d. according to µ. We consider automata of bounded size that input and output at stage t. We prove the existence of a constant C such that, whenever , with...

The fact that the Bologna process involves significant changes in teaching and that teachers are alone in carrying out these changes, encouraged a group of professors from different Spanish universities to present the opportunity / need for professors to exchange views and experiences in...

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design of both communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by bounded rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories...

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to analyze the compatibility between entrepreneurial and social attitudes. Specifically, we analyze if subjects with a more developed economic entrepreneurial attitude exhibit a less social attitude. Design/methodology/approach – Our methodology integrates...

This work shows the results of experiments where subjects play the Schelling's spatial proximity model (1969, 1971a), in which choices are made sequentially, and a variation of it where the decision-making is simultaneous. The results of the sequential experiments are identical to Schelling's...