This paper provides a dynamic extension of Peters (2010) directed search model. The point is to characterize the evolution of wage outcomes over time. The primary result of that paper, which is reproduced here, is that workers use random application strategies when they are searching for new...

The recent literature on competing mechanisms has devoted a lot of effort at understanding a very complex and abstract issue. In particular, an agent's type in a competitive environment is hard to conceptualize because it depends on information the agent has about what is going on in the rest of...

It is known that mechanism designers can extract agents' information about competitors' mechanisms in a competing mechanism game. This makes it possible for sellers to punish each other for deviations even when they do not directly observe other sellers' mechanisms. This allows for very...

We study an incomplete information game in which players are involved in a reciprocal relationship that allows them to coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this as a competing mechanism game in which players have the ability to write contracts. We characterize the...

We study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game. By refusing to participate in the mechanism, a player can revert to playing the default game non-cooperatively. We show with an example that some allocation rules are...

This paper studies Bayesian equilibrium in a worker firm matching problem in which workers choose their human capi- tal investment and firms choose wages before the matching process occurs. Symmetric equilibrium exists, and supports assortative matching. However, when the number of traders is...

Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games...

The paper proves existence of equilibrium in a fairly general version of the pre-marital investment game. The game has discontinuous payoffs, so the method of Reny (1999) is used. Three assumptions are imposed on the matching process that occurs after investments are realized. It must be...

This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2000) in a market where traders values are interdependent. Conditions are given for which this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that are the same as the...

This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter...