We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...

We investigate whether revealing the identities in a public good game that includes a donation incentive leads to higher contributions to the public good. Previous evidence suggests that contributions to a public good increase significantly when these take place in public. Also, the amount of...

Crowdfunding allows the public to donate small amounts of money to entrepreneurs through online platforms. In contrast with traditional financial institutions, this new method facilitates the financing process through direct and easy online contact between initiators and investors. Based on the...

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose...

This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE), and of a randomized strategy equilibrium...

With the formation of the competitive electricity markets in the world, optimization of bidding strategies has become one of the main discussions in studies related to market designing. Market design is challenged by multiple objectives that need to be satisfied. The solution of those...

With the increasing use of different types of auctions in market designing, modeling of participants' behaviors to evaluate the market structure is one of the main discussions in the studies related to the deregulated power industries. In this article, we apply an approach of the optimal bidding...

This paper presents the competitive supply chain network design problem in which n decentralized supply chains simultaneously enter the market with no existing rival chain, shape their networks and set wholesale and retail prices in competitive mode. The customer demand is elastic and price...

We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in...