Showing 1 - 10 of 43,905
results are extended to a model of learning, in which type k plays a k times iterated best response the average of past play …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281423
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP … equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP … equilibrium under a wide class of learning processes. We study two versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531900
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP … equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750758
A compound game is an (n + 1) player game based on n two-person subgames. In each of these subgames player 0 plays against one of the other players. Player 0 is regulated, so that he must choose the same strategy in all n subgames. We show that every fictitious play process approaches the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753121
Fictitious play and "gradient" learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly … randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively di®erent from learning at the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636467
results are extended to a model of learning, in which type k plays a k times iterated best response the average of past play …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049877
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2×2-coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that if agents may only support a limited number of links payoff dominant conventions will emerge in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042966
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to Nash equilibrium provided that the overall game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663198
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026511