We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes...

We apply stochastic stability to study the evolution of bidding behaviour in private-value second-price, first-price and k-double auctions. The learning process has a strong component of inertia but with a small probability, the bids are modified in the direction of ex-post regrets. We identify...

We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n k bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. The good that is auctioned is a...

We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We model new experience goods in the context of dynamic mechanism design. These are goods for which an agent is unsure of her valuation but can learn it through consumption experience. We consider a dynamic environment with a single buyer and seller in which contracting occurs over T periods,...

We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n k bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. The good that is auctioned is a...

Italian Abstract: Vengono esposti i principi base della teoria delle aste. Quali le questioni da risolvere, quali ingredienti, quali ipotesi necessarie per semplificare una teoria altrimenti piuttosto complessa. Vengono sviluppati i meccanismi d'asta al I e al II prezzo, risolvendo per le...

We model new experience goods in the context of dynamic mechanism design. These are goods for which an agent is unsure of her valuation but can learn it through consumption experience. We consider a dynamic environment with a single buyer and seller in which contracting occurs over T periods,...

We study the design of information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize. We find that although submission is a onetime event for each agent, different disclosure...

Abstract This paper proposes an intuitive rationale for late bidding in online venues. The expected surplus from bidding on subsequent auctions for equivalent items creates an option value to losing the current auction. This option is dynamic due to the stochastic arrival of new auctions and...