We analyze incentives for loan officers in a model with hidden action, limited liability and truth-telling constraints under the assumption that the principal has private information from an automatic scoring system. First we show that the truth-telling problem reduces the bank’s expected...

This paper deals with a moral hazard problem resulting from a combined hidden action and hidden information situation.

Im Unterschied zu leasingspezifischen Abhandlungen unter Betonung praxisorientierter Fragestellungen, die insbesondere auf geschäftspolitische Untersuchungsgegenstände fokussieren, stellen die folgenden Ausführungen einen Beitrag zur Analyse von Leasing-transaktionen aus der Perspektive der...

We use a principal-agent framework to reexamine the implications of the negligence and strict liability rules when the tortfeasor is an agency. (...)

Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, in die ökonomische Analyse des Versicherungsbetrugs einzuführenund einige grundlegende Determinanten für vertragswidriges Verhalten von Versicherungsnehmern aufzuzeigen. Dazu werden zunächst die strategischen Entscheidungsprobleme von Versicherungsneh-mern und...

This paper focuses on an examination of the shareholder-manager conflict.

This paper considers the effects of strategic substitutabilities on performanceand incentives in venture capital financing. The analysis points to a subtlelink between two pivotal roles of venture capitalists: (i) monitoring venturesand setting performance incentives...

This paper estimates the issuers' demand for the banker's underwriting service across different varieties of equity-linked securities.

We are interested in the macroeconomic implications of the separation of ownership andcontrol. An alternative decentralized interpretation of the stochastic growth model isproposed, one where shareholders hire a self-interested manager who is in charge of thefirm's hiring and investment...