Long-run oligopolistic expansion behavior in an electricity supply market is modeled in this paper.

This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all...

Given a game and a dynamics on the space of strategies it is possible to associate to any component of Nash equilibria, an integer, this is the index, see Ritzberger (1994). This number gives useful information on the equilibrium set and in particular on its stability properties under the given...

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R & D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as fuctions of the "amount of knowledge" disclosed by the leading to the lagging agent,...

If a solution (on a closed family of games) satisfies dummy axiom (DUM) and independance of irrelevant strategies (IIS) then it also satisfies consistency (CONS) (proposition 2.21, Peleg and Tijs, 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor IIS as shown in...

In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential , the one-shot simultaneous, and the...

In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

The authors develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs.

We consider a class of microeconomic models with interacting agents which replicate the main properties of asset prices time series: nonlinearities i levels and common degree of long-memory in the volatilities and co-volatilities of multivariate time series. For these models, longrange...

We show that a class of microeconomic behavioral models with interacting agents, derived from Kirman (1991, 1993), can replicate the empirical long-memory properties of the two first conditional moments of financial time series. The essence of these models is that the forecasts and thus the...