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Jocul ciclic – Statele Unite ale Americii versus Coreea de Nord din unghiul teoriei mutărilor strategice
Alexandru, Georgescu - In: Revista OEconomica (2011) 04
It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010965563
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Power, Outcomes and Preferences
Holler, Manfred J.; Nurmi, Hannu - In: Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer … 225 (2005) 2, pp. 181-191
There is an ongoing discussion about the relationship of power and preferences: Is power reflected in what the agents can do and what they want to do, or, alternatively, are preferences and power two separate dimensions of determining the outcome of decisionmaking? In the latter case...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027154
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The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games
Hehenkamp, Burkhard - 2005
characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers … analyzing the strategic advantage. -- strategic advantage ; interdependent preferences ; spillovers ; action monotonicity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003891788
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Opinion Polarization in a Parliamentary Institution Generates Extreme Legislation
Gottesman, Avinat - 2021
How does opinion polarization over matters of moral conviction affect the legislative outcome of parliamentary institutions? Analysis reveals that in the relatively common case, in which a party's voting power is positively correlated with the public support of the convictions it represents, if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251897
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Cartel Stability Under an Optimal Sharing Rule
Weikard, Hans-Peter - 2005
players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called optimal sharing which … cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called non-essentiality and determine the set of stable … cartels under optimal sharing if spillovers are positive and if the non-essentiality property applies. Finally I analyse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064613
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Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677116
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Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854041
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Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a "detail free" description, in a natural language, of the agents' interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895695
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The role of information in contests
Dubey, Pradeep - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 160-163
Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678824
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Theory of Combinatorial Games
Fraenkel, Aviezri S.; Hearn, Robert A.; Siegel, Aaron N. - Elsevier
Aim: To present a systematic development of the theory of combinatorial games from the ground up. Approach: Computational complexity. Combinatorial games are completely determined; the questions of interest are efficiencies of strategies. Methodology: Divide and conquer. Ascend from Nim to Chess...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255426