A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
Wesley H. Holliday, Mikayla Kelley
| Year of publication: |
2020
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| Authors: | Holliday, Wesley H. ; Kelley, Mikayla |
| Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 55.2020, 2, p. 243-253
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| Subject: | Social choice without Pareto | Non-imposition | Strict non-imposition | Citizens' sovereignty | Wilson's theorem | Incomplete social preference | Regularity | Minimal comparability | Yasusuke Murakami | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
| Type of publication: | Article |
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| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00355-020-01238-2 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012262729