All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Year of publication:	July 2019
Authors:	Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro
Publisher:	Barcelona : GSE, Graduate School of Economics
Subject:	Obvious Strategy-proofness \| Sequential Allotment Rules \| Division Problem \| Single-peaked Preferences \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule

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