Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain : axiomatic characterizations

C. Gizem Korpeoglu

Year of publication:	April 2018
Authors:	Korpeoglu, C. Gizem
Subject:	Matching \| Indivisible object \| Strategy-proofness \| Pareto optimality \| Full preference domain \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Pareto-Optimum \| Pareto efficiency \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Unteilbare Güter \| Indivisible goods \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function

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