Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Jun, Byoung Heon ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. |
Publisher: |
München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY) |
Subject: | Auctions | signalling | mechanism design |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.5282/ubm/epub.15653 [DOI] 757206204 [GVK] hdl:10419/93904 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:403 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D21 - Firm Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing |
Source: |
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