CEO contract design : how do strong principals do it?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cronqvist, Henrik ; Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 108.2013, 3, p. 659-674
|
Subject: | LBOs | Employment contracts | Contracting theory | Executive compensation | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Managervergütung | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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