Characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Morimoto, Shuhei ; Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Ching, Stephen
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	Güter \| Allokation \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Theorie \| strategy-proofness \| several infinitely divisible commodities \| uniform rule \| separable preferences

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 769
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	618441069 [GVK] hdl:10419/92677 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332300