Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Klümper, Andreas ; Kräkel, Matthias |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 192.2020, p. 1-4
|
Subject: | Risk aversion | Behavioral contract theory | Moral hazard | Moral Hazard | Risikoaversion | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Korrelation | Correlation |
-
Are CEOs paid extra for riskier pay packages?
Albuquerque, Ana, (2020)
-
Incentive design for reference-dependent preferences
Gonzalez Jimenez, Victor H., (2024)
-
Aversion to the variability of pay and the structure of executive compensation contracts
Chaigneau, Pierre, (2015)
- More ...
-
New results for exactly solvable critical RSOS models and vertex models in two dimensions
Klümper, Andreas, (1993)
-
Conformal weights of RSOS lattice models and their fusion hierarchies
Klümper, Andreas, (1992)
-
Games Between Players with Dual-Selves
Dato, Simon, (2022)
- More ...