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Deterministic mechanisms are optimal in standard principal-agent models

Roland Strausz
Year of publication:
2004
Authors: Strausz, Roland
Publisher: Berlin : Freie Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
Subject: Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory
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