Dividing by demanding : object division through market procedures

Claus-Jochen Haake

We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential. -- Object Division ; Market Procedure ; Perles-Maschler Solution

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Year of publication:	2004
Other Persons:	Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor)
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Inst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Allgemeines Gleichgewicht \| General equilibrium