Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nath, Swaprava ; Zoeter, Onno ; Narahari, Y. ; Dance, Christopher R. |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 19.2015, 3, p. 211-228
|
Subject: | Dynamic mechanism design | Interdependent value | Dynamic pivot mechanism | Markov decision problem | Dynamic games | Nash equilibrium | Social choice | Collective action | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie | Economic dynamics | Markov-Kette | Markov chain |
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