Essays on Incentive Contracts, M&As, and Firm Risk

The three essays collected in this PhD dissertation concern agency costs, incentive contracts, mergers and acquisitions, and firm risk. The first essay demonstrates that manager sentiment, a managerial trait proxy for managerial optimism, can incur agency costs. The second and third essays state incentive contracts as an effective way to suppress agency problems and reduce agency costs. Specifically, the second essay demonstrates that firms using relative performance evaluation exhibit lower stock price crash risk and the third essay finds that relative performance evaluation increases long-term acquisition performance

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	An, Suwei
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Risikomanagement \| Risk management \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Risiko \| Risk

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254569