Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
Dmitry Orlov
| Year of publication: |
2022
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Orlov, Dmitry |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 206.2022, p. 1-37
|
| Subject: | Communication | Dynamic contracts | Interventions | Monitoring | Performance evaluations | Repeated moral hazard | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105550 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477756