How the design of CEO equity-based compensation can lead to lower audit fees : evidence from Australia
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Qu, Xin ; Yao, Daifei ; Percy, Majella |
Subject: | Equity-based compensation | Audit fees | Agency theory | CEO incentives | Vesting hurdles | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Australien | Australia | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Honorar | Fee (Remuneration) | Aktienoption | Stock option | Gebühr | Charges | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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