Majoritarian preference, utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Roy, Jaideep ; Silvers, Randy ; Sun, Ching-Jen |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 116.2019, p. 269-288
|
Subject: | Conflict | Collective Bayesian persuasion | Condorcet winner | Cournot oligopoly | Majoritarian preference | Precision of public information | Uncertain costs | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Information |
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