Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting system.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014-12-19
Authors:	Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. ; Ulungu, Berthold E.-L.

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. and Ulungu, Berthold E.-L. (2014): Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory. Published in: International Journal of Applied Mathematical Research , Vol. 4, No. 1 (27 January 2015): pp. 177-182.
Classification:	B16 - History of Economic Thought: Quantitative and Mathematical ; C10 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General. General ; C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015246756