On analysis and characterization of the mean-median compromise method

Most important results in Social Choice Theory concern impossibility theorems. They claim that no function, as complex as it might be, can satisfy simultaneously a restricted number of fair properties describing a democratic system. However, adopting new voting ideas can push back those limits. Some years ago, such a work was boosted by Balinski and Laraki on the basis of evaluations cast by voters to competitors; this is an alternative to arrovian framework which is based on ranking candidates by voters. Recently, Ngoie and Ulungu have proposed a new voting function – defined in both Balinski and Laraki’s spirit – which hybridizes Majority Judgment (MJ) and Borda Majority Count (BMC): the so-called Mean-Median Compromise Method (MMCM). The method puts at its credit the desired properties of MJ and BMC as well; indeed, it reduces their insufficiencies. The purpose of this paper is double: analyse and characterize MMCM features in comparison to other valuable voting functions.