Mechanism Design with Acquisition of Correlated Information

Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. Information gathering is covert. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficient implementation and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Bikhchandani, Sushil
Other Persons:	Obara, Ichiro (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Übernahme \| Takeover \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Korrelation \| Correlation \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information

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