Merger Control on Two-Sided Markets : Is There Need for an Efficiency Defense?

We study horizontal mergers on two-sided markets between horizontally differentiated platforms. We provide a theoretical analysis of the merger's price effect based on the amount of cost savings it generates, the behavior of outsider platforms, and the size of cross-group network effects. We point out differences as compared with the standard, one-sided merger analysis, and also discuss the merger control policy implications

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Baranes, Edmond
Other Persons:	Cortade, Thomas (contributor) ; Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Fusionskontrolle \| Merger control \| Effizienz \| Efficiency \| Fusion \| Merger \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy \| Netzwerkökonomik \| Network economics \| EU-Staaten \| EU countries

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
Series:	NET Institute Working Paper ; No. 14-12
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 30, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2506359 [DOI]
Classification:	L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K21 - Antitrust Law
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046101