Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Brandt, Felix ; Brill, Markus ; Fischer, Felix ; Harrenstein, Paul |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 42.2014, 3, p. 551-574
|
Subject: | Social Choice Theory | Tournament Solutions | Retentiveness | Tournament Equilibrium Set | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wettbewerb | Competition | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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