• Figures
  • Tables
  • Formulae
  • Zusammenfassung
  • Summary
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Background on spectrum regulation
  • 2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons
  • 2.2 Spectrum regulatory processes
  • 2.3 Use models and regulatory decision approaches
  • 2.4 Uncoordinated spectrum approaches and coordination mechanisms
  • 2.5 Licence vs. licence-exempt determinations
  • 2.6 Band plan determinations
  • 2.7 Setting receiver sensitivity standards
  • 3 Spectrum Policy in Europe
  • 3.1 Spectrum regulation in the EU
  • 3.2 Spectrum regulation in Germany
  • 4 Advancing spectrum policy
  • 4.1 Major trends in Europe
  • 4.2 WAPECS initiative
  • 4.3 The Interference Temperature
  • 5 Economics of policy determinations
  • 5.1 Inherent error in administrative determinations
  • 5.2 Price-guided determinations
  • 6 Search for solutions
  • 6.1 ComReg 26 GHz fixed service band auction
  • 6.2 OFCOM 2.6 GHz auction
  • 6.3 U.S. FCC research
  • 6.4 BNetzA UMTS spectrum auction
  • 7 Mathematical model of the problem
  • 7.1 Basic elements of the model
  • 7.2 Shannon-Hartley Theorem as indifference curve
  • 7.3 Modelling the value of exclusive, collective and licence-exempt use
  • 8 Proof of concept model
  • 8.1 MS Excel model
  • 8.2 Results and analysis
  • 9 Discussion
  • 9.1 Most actionable initial implementations in Europe
  • 9.2 Implications of international and EU commitments
  • 9.3 Market power and competition policy
  • 10 Conclusion
  • References