- Figures
- Tables
- Formulae
- Zusammenfassung
- Summary
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background on spectrum regulation
- 2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons
- 2.2 Spectrum regulatory processes
- 2.3 Use models and regulatory decision approaches
- 2.4 Uncoordinated spectrum approaches and coordination mechanisms
- 2.5 Licence vs. licence-exempt determinations
- 2.6 Band plan determinations
- 2.7 Setting receiver sensitivity standards
- 3 Spectrum Policy in Europe
- 3.1 Spectrum regulation in the EU
- 3.2 Spectrum regulation in Germany
- 4 Advancing spectrum policy
- 4.1 Major trends in Europe
- 4.2 WAPECS initiative
- 4.3 The Interference Temperature
- 5 Economics of policy determinations
- 5.1 Inherent error in administrative determinations
- 5.2 Price-guided determinations
- 6 Search for solutions
- 6.1 ComReg 26 GHz fixed service band auction
- 6.2 OFCOM 2.6 GHz auction
- 6.3 U.S. FCC research
- 6.4 BNetzA UMTS spectrum auction
- 7 Mathematical model of the problem
- 7.1 Basic elements of the model
- 7.2 Shannon-Hartley Theorem as indifference curve
- 7.3 Modelling the value of exclusive, collective and licence-exempt use
- 8 Proof of concept model
- 8.1 MS Excel model
- 8.2 Results and analysis
- 9 Discussion
- 9.1 Most actionable initial implementations in Europe
- 9.2 Implications of international and EU commitments
- 9.3 Market power and competition policy
- 10 Conclusion
- References
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