On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players

We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.

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Year of publication:	2007-10
Authors:	Aguirre, Arin ; Javier, Francisco ; Feltkamp, Vincent
Institutions:	Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Subject:	monotonicity \| core \| nucleolus per capita \| TU games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IKERLANAK.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Ikerlanak 2007.28 Number 2007-28
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518764