On the optimal use of correlated information in contractual design under limited liability

Daniel Danau (Normandie Université, UNICAEN, CREM CNRS, France), Annalisa Vinella (University of Bari Aldo Moro, Italy)

Year of publication:	[2016]
Authors:	Danau, Daniel ; Vinella, Annalisa
Publisher:	[Rennes] : Center for Research in Economics and Management, University of Rennes 1, University of Caen Normandie
Subject:	Incentive compatibility \| Limited liability \| Correlated signals \| Conditional probability \| Full-rank condition \| Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Beschränkte Haftung \| Signalling \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Haftung \| Liability \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Korrelation \| Correlation

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